This paper examines possibility of partial ex post implementation under general utility functions which is not necessarily differentiable or quasi-linear with respect to money. We deal with an interdependent-value model in which there are two agents, two alternatives and each agent receives more than two dimensional private signal. The main result of this paper is that under generic utility functions, a public decision rule must be almost constant if it can be ex post incentive compatible with some transfer rule.
Introduction
Harsanyi doctrine, which was introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) , is now a standardized assumption in modeling situations with asymmetric information. It asserts that the prior distribution over the state of nature is shared by all players and common knowledge. Although Harsanyi doctrine and its central concepts, Bayesian game and Bayesian equilibrium, have been contributing to deepen our understanding of asymmetric information situations, they have few convincing foundations 1 . There are plenty of situations to which Mertens and Zamir (1985) 's universal type space models are well suited rather than naïve Bayesian games with Bayesian equilibria.
In considering mechanism design, using Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept, is inappropriate for situations in the realm of a universal type space model. If Harsanyi doctrine is satisfied among agents and the mechanism designer know this fact and the prior distribution, then mechanisms based on Bayesian incentive compatibility can generate desired outcomes.
However, it is possible that a slight deviation from Harsanyi doctrine may cause a hazardous outcome.
On the other hand, ex post equilibrium 2 does not suffer from the above problem. it is a belief-free concept in which each agent have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy whichever beliefs agents may form. As formally argued in Bergemann and Morris (2005) , ex post incentive compatibility is a natural concept of mechanism design in situations where Harsanyi doctrine is not guaranteed.
Unfortunately, a negative result about ex post equilibrium was found. Jehiel, Meyerter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame (2006, hereafter JMMZ) considered a model with multidimensional signals and interdependent values, and proved that under generic utility functions, an ex post incentive compatible mechanism must generate almost constant social outcomes. Their argument depends on the assumption that utility functions are quasilinear and differentiable.
This paper studies partial ex post implementation in the case that utility functions are not necessarily quasilinear nor differentiable. We considers a model with two agents and two alternatives. Each agent receives a multi-dimensional signal, and has a utility function depending on the other player's information. The mechanism designer can use monetary transfer, and as already mentioned agents may exhibit nonlinear preference with respect to money.
The main result of this paper is that even in the space of such general utility functions, an ex post incentive compatible mechanism returns almost constant social outcomes for generic utility functions. In a model with multi-dimensional signals, the functional form of each agent i's utility function puts a severe restriction on functional forms of incentive compatible mechanisms, and these two restrictions generically contradict each other. In fact, deriving such a contradiction for a general utility function is technically challenging. Instead, we focus on densely existing treatable functions and prove that this kind of contradiction occurs under them (Section 4). Also, we can prove that each of them has some neighborhood in which partial ex post implementation is impossible for almost all functions (Section 5).
Although quasilinear utility functions are predominant due to their tractability, they provide quite rough approximation of agents' behavior. As JMMZ and Milgrom (2004) mentioned, quasi-linear utility functions nicely fit when amount of monetary transfer is sufficiently small or agents have abundant liquidity. There are however several interesting situations in which large amounts of money are transfered and agents face liquidity problems. For example, Salant (1997) reported as a participant of spectrum actions that bidders had budget problems, and they were strategically important and unknown to the other bidders. It justifies us in considering that in general bidding-cost functions are non-linear, and depend on signals. There have been papers studying budget constrained agents 3 (Pitchik and Schotter (1988) , Laffont and Robert (1996) , Maskin (2000) , Gale (1998, 2000) , Fang and Parreiras (2001) , and Benoît and Krishna (2001) ). Also, non-linear bidding-cost functions are extensively studied mainly in the context of all-pay auction. Examples of such studies are Sela (2001, 2007) and Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2002) .
Several papers found positive results about ex post incentive compatibility. See, for example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Perry and Reny (2002) , Chung and Ely (2006) and Bikhchandani (2005) .
We make two remarks on the relation between JMMZ and this paper. First their result does not imply that of this paper. It is because their set of preferences is quite small, or nowhere dense mathematically speaking, in the space of general utility functions. Second, their techniques are not applicable to our environments, even if we restricted utility functions to be differentiable. The key part of their proof is that the first order derivative of agent i's utility function depends only on the state of nature. Obviously, this is true for quasilinear utility functions but in general false for non-quasilinear utility functions.
It is worth mentioning the difference between the result of this paper and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, originated by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) . The most similar work is Barbera (1983) , in which each agent has a continuous preference. The main difference is that, in this paper, agents state only finite-dimensional signals, while in Barbera (1983) they state their whole preferences, which contains infinite-dimensional information. In other words, this paper puts a strong restriction on the domain of social choice functions: the domain, or the set of possible preferences, can be embedded to a finite-dimensional space.
This paper is organized as follows.In section 2, we present the model and show the statement of the main theorem. In section 3, we derive a geometric necessary condition for ex post incentive comaptibility. In section 4, we define L[i] and see it is dense set and an impossibility result holds in it. In section 5, we finish the proof of the main theorem. In section 6, we discuss about extensions of the main theorem and related issues. Section 7 is the conclusion.
The Model
First we introduce mathematical notations. Let X be a topological space and S a subset of X. We denote by S • the interior of S, by S the closure of S, and by ∂S the boundary of S. We usually use topologies of Euclidean spaces rather than relative topologies. Otherwise, the underlying topology is mentioned.
We consider an environment with two agents N = {1, 2}, and two alternatives A = {a 1 , a 2 }. We denote agents by i and j, and i = j unless otherwise mentioned. Each agent i ∈ N receives private signal θ i ∈ Θ i , where the signal space Θ i is a compact convex subset of
is the pointwise limit of
designer to use monetary transfer, but the amount of money m is restricted to a nonempty compact interval M of R.
Each agent i ∈ N has a utility function u i (a, m; θ), where a ∈ A is an alternative, m ∈ M is an amount of money and θ ∈ Θ is a state of nature. For each such u i , we define
We omit the argument u i when it is apparent. µ i [u i ] stands for the relative attractiveness of a 1 compared to a 2 , when each a k is accompanied by m k amount of money. Take a fixed non-zero η i ∈ R d i \{0} for each i ∈ N . We let U i be the set of u i : A×M ×Θ → R satisfying the following properties:
We refer to the third property as monotonicity of µ i . We endow U i with the uniform metric 4 .
A public decision rule 5 is defined to be a mapping f : Θ → A.
We restrict mechanisms to direct mechanisms and equilibria to the truth-telling equilibrium. It is justified because the revelation principle is also applicable to ex post incentive compatibility. A transfer rule is defined as a pair of mappings t = (t 1 , t 2 ) : Θ → M 2 . A direct mechanism is a pair (f, t) of public decision rule f and transfer rule t.
A public decision rule f is ex post incentive compatible under u ∈ U if there exists a transfer rule t such that (f, t) is ex post incentive compatible under u.
Using sections 3-5, we prove the following theorem. In section 6, this theorem will be extended in various directions.
Theorem 1.
There exists a residual set R of U such that, for all u ∈ R and public decision rule f , if f is ex post incentive compatible under u then f is almost constant. 4 In this case, the uniform metric d∞ is defined by
5 JMMZ calls it a social choice function. 6 In the terminology of JMMZ, an almost constant public decision rule is a trivial social choice function.
A residual set is topologically large set. It contains as a subset the countable intersection of open dense sets, or equivalently, its complement is at most the countable union of nowhere dense sets. Thus, we can say that a residual set contains as elements almost all or generic elements of the universal set.
The above theorem tells us that in generic situations, the mechanism designer is unable to construct any meaningful mechanism satisfying ex post incentive compatibility.
Geographical Properties
First, we generalize the ex post taxation principle, 7 which was proved by Chung and Ely (2006), to our non-quasilinear model. For convenience, we allow monetary transfer m to be −∞ and define u i (a, −∞; θ) = −∞. We denote M ∪ {−∞} by M , and define T i by
Let
Proposition 1 (Chung and Ely 2006).
Assume that a direct mechanism (f, t * ) is ex post incentive compatible under u ∈ U. Then there exists t ∈ T such that, for all i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ,
Proof. Since u i (a, m; θ) is strictly increasing with respect to m, ex post incentive compatibility implies that t i
is well-defined, and satisfies the above property.
For notational simplicity, we denote t i (a k , θ j ) by t i k (θ j ) (k = 1, 2), and
The taxation principle reduces agent i's decision problem to the following situation. Agent i chooses a from A after observing both θ i and θ j . If agent i's choice is a k , then agent i receives t i k (θ j ) amount of money. When t i (θ j ) = −∞, the alternative a is "not for sale," so agent cannot buy a and thus must choose a m = a .
The ex post taxation principle tells us useful properties of ex post incentive compatible public choice rule f . Choose t ∈ T satisfying (4). Then, for fixedθ
is a continuous function of θ i . Since µ i increases as θ i goes in η i -direction, the sign of µ i is as depicted in Figure 1 . Due to (4), we know that f (θ i ,θ j ) = a 1 for θ i at which µ i > 0, and that f (θ i ,θ j ) = a 2 for θ i at which µ i < 0. As in Figure 1 , two areas
The relationship between the indifference curve and f .
We call the set (6) agent i's indifference curve 8 atθ j , on which two alternatives are indifferent for agent i. Thus we can conclude that agent i's indifference curve atθ j determines the value of f (θ i ,θ j ) for almost all θ i . In the rest of the paper, we fully exploit good properties of closed sets. Although f −1 (a 1 ) and f −1 (a 2 ) are not necessarily closed sets, we can interpret f as a pair of closed set by taking the closures of f −1 (a 1 ) and f −1 (a 2 ). Define However, this condition is too weak. For example, any u ∈ U can implement (A 1 , A 2 ) = (Θ, Θ). This motivates us to put some restriction on (A 1 , A 2 ).
Let S * be the set of monotonic (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ S.
Lemma 2. Assume that a public decision rule f is ex post incentive compatible under
Proof. See Appendix.
The monotonicity of (A 1 (f ), A 2 (f )) is a natural consequence of the monotonicity of µ 1 and µ 2 . For simplicity, assumeθ ∈ Θ • satisfies f (θ) = a 1 . Take small positive real numbers α 1 and α 2 . Because of the monotonicity of µ 1 , f (θ 1 ,θ 2 ) = a 1 in a neighborhood ofθ 1 + α 1 η 1 . Also by the monotonicity of µ 2 , we can find a neighborhood ofθ 2 
The next proposition summarizes this section's argument. Let S * nc be the set of monotonic (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ S which is neither (Θ, ∂Θ) or (∂Θ, Θ). Given S ⊆ S, we define U(S ) as the set of u ∈ U implementing some (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ S .
Proposition 2. Assume that a public decision rule f which is not almost constant is ex post incentive compatible under
Thus, in order to prove Theorem 1, it suffices to show that U \ U(S * nc ) is residual, or equivalently that U(S * nc ) is meager. For a technical reason, for each i ∈ N we introduce a set S * [i], which is the set of (
, what we should show is that each S * [i] is meager.
Density of Impossible Sets
In this section, we introduce a dense set L[i] of U , which is proved to be disjoint with U(S * [i] ). This implies that the complement of U(S * [i] ) is a dense subset of U (Proposition 3).
Piecewise Linear Functions
Here we define L[i] for each i and prove that it is dense in U (Lemma 4). Before doing these things, we define piecewise linear functions.
Figure 2: Piecewise linear approximation.
0 denote the set of piecewise linear utility function of agent i.
It is a mathematical fact that any continuous function whose domain is a compact subset of R d is approximated by some sequence of piecewise linear functions. Figure 2 show an approximation procedure for the one-dimensional case. The original function f is uniformly continuous. Therefore, by taking n → ∞, the sequence of approximating piecewise linear functions {f n } converges to the original function. By following a similar procedure, we obtain that L 0 is a dense set of U.
as the set of u ∈ U such that there exists non-zero ζ i ∈ R d i orthogonal to η i satisfying these properties:
Proof. By adding a small perturbation, any element of L 0 can be an element of
Impossibility
In this subsection, we prove that
Proof. The second statement is an corollary of the first. The proof of the first part is in Appendix.
Assume that there areθ
At the same time, the monotonicity of (A 1 , A 2 ) pulls back i's indifference curve in (−η i )-direction. These two effects contradict each other, and therefore B i (θ j ) cannot have a nonempty interior for any θ i ∈ Θ i• .
As a corollary of this lemma, the following would be intuitively obvious:
The next lemma is the main result of this subsection:
Sketch of Proof.
Here we see a rough sketch of the proof. Details are in Appendix.
Remember that µ j is a piecewise linear function, so each B j (θ i ) consists of segments of hyperplains (and ∂Θ j ) 10 . We can takeθ i as an element of Θ i• whose B j (θ i ) consists of the largest number of segments of hyperplains among {B( 
is a segments of hyperplain parallel toĤ n , and
There must be n such that H n (θ i ) is not locally constant atθ i . Take sufficiently small open
Let H be the image of B j * , i.e., {B
The elements of H satisfy an all-or-nothing property: for all H, H ∈ H, H and H are equal or disjoint. This implies the following fact:
) is nonempty and constant within H ∈ H.
It is very difficult for B i * (θ j ) to be constant because µ i 's cross-term twists i's indifference curve {θ i | µ i (θ; t i (θ j )) = 0}, and obviously it is possible only when B i * (θ j ) has a non-empty interior. Now what we should do is to find θ j ∈ V j * whose B i * (θ j ) has the empty interior. The following fact is useful to find such θ j . The proposition below is the summary of this section.
Fact: For an open set
U j ∈ Θ j , there is θ j ∈ U j at which B i (θ j ) has a non-empty interior.
Proposition 3. U \ U(S
and Lemmata 4 and 6.
The Proof of The Main Theorem

In order to prove U(S[i]) is meager, it suffices to find
In the previous section we proved the complement of U (S * [i]) is dense, so (i) is automatically satisfied. Thus, what we should do is to find {K n } ∞ n=1 satisfying (ii) and (iii). The next lemma is a useful tool to check (ii).
Lemma 7. Let T be a closed subset of S. Then U(S * ∩ T ) is closed in U.
To get an intuition, consider the following simple situation. Assume that (u n , t n ) implements (A 1,n , A 2,n ) ∈ S * ∩ T and that limits of these sequences exist. First, we informally see that (u, t) implements (A 1 , A 2 ) . By the definition of implementation, we know that, for each i and n,
These inclusion relationships are preserved even in the limit:
are continuous with respect to u i , m 1 and m 2 (Lemma 18 in Appendix). Also, we obtain
We see an example of closed subsets of S. We denote the Hausdorff metric by ρ.
Then T [i](ε) is a closed subset of S (the proof is routine and left to the reader). Notice that
Finally we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Each U(S * [i]
) is meager by Propositions 3 and 4. Since any finite union of meager sets is also meager, U(S * nc ) = U(S * [1] )∪U(S * [2] ) is also meager. Let R = U \U(S * nc ). Then R is residual. Also, by Proposition 2 and the definition of U(S * nc ), we obtain that for all u ∈ R, if f is ex post incentive compatible under u then f must be almost constant.
Extensions and Discussion
In this section, we discuss about several extensions of Theorem 1 and related issues. To make our model general, we introduce new notations. Let M ⊆ R and Θ i ⊆ R d i for each i. Otherwise mentioned, we assume M is a compact interval and each Θ i is a compact convex set whose interior is nonempty. We define the set
1. u i is continuous, and 2. u i (a, m; θ) is strictly increasing in m.
We endow U i 0 with the topology of uniform convergence on compacta 11 . Note that in the case that M and each Θ i are compact, the topology of uniform convergence on compacta and the topology induced by the uniform metric coincide.
Let η i be a non-zero element of
is strictly increasing in α.
Notice what we have considered is U 0 (η).
n-Agent Models
Theorem 1, and other results we will argue in this section, can be easily extended to n-agent cases. We can reduce a n-agent model to a two-agent model by fixing (θ 3 , . . . , θ n ), which is justified since we are studying ex post equilibrium.
The Case M = R
We have restricted M to be a compact interval. Here we consider the case M = R. Given A > 0, we say that a transfer rule t : Θ → M 2 is A-bounded if sup i,θ |t i (θ)| < A, and that t is bounded if t is A-bounded for some A > 0. Proof. Applying the technique used in the proof of Theorem 1, 12 we can take a residual set R n for each n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} whose element u satisfy the following: For all public decision rule f and n-bounded transfer rule t, if (f, t) is ex post incentive compatible under u then f is constant. Let R = ∞ n=1 R n . Then R is also residual and satisfies the desired property. 
| converges to 0 as n goes to infinity. The topology of uniform convergence on compacta is the topology induced by this convergence concept.
12 A few modifications are needed in approximating utility functions by piecewise linear functions.
Quasilinear Utility Functions
For quasilinear utility functions, we can achieve the generic impossibility result by using the completely same procedure as non-quasilinear utility functions.
Differentiable Utility Functions
We can also prove the generic impossibility theorem for differentiable utility functions, although L[i] is not dense in the space of differentiable utility functions. We use the following mathematical fact: In a topological space X, if S ⊆ X is dense and R ⊆ X is residual, then S ∩ R is residual in S. It is an easy exercise of general topology.
Define C n (η) (n = 1, 2, . . . , ∞) to be the set of u ∈ U 0 (η) such that each u i (a, m; θ) is n-times continuously differentiable with respect to m and θ. Proof. This is because C n (η) is dense in U 0 (η).
Without the Monotonicity of µ i
We can drop the assumption of the monotonicity of µ i . First we see the cases of differentiable quasilinear utility functions, which are analyzed in JMMZ (2006). Let C n QL be the set of u ∈ U 0 satisfying the following for each i: 
Take q i : Θ * → Q ++ and η i : Θ * → Q d i \ {0} for each i. We denote (q 1 , q 2 ) by q and (η 1 , η 2 ) by η. Let V(q, η) be the set of u ∈ C n QL satisfying the following for all θ * ∈ Θ * : For all
Note that any u ∈ C n QL is in V(q, η) for some (q, η). Applying the technique used in Theorem 3 to V(q, η), for each θ * ∈ Θ * , there exists a residual set R(q, η; θ * ) in which ex post incentive compatible public decision rules must be constant within
is residual in V(q, η), and under u ∈ R(q, η) ex post incentive compatible public decision rules must be almost constant.
Since candidates of q and η are countable, M is also meager. Let R be the complement of M, in which ex post incentive compatible public decision rules must be almost constant.
This theorem can be extended to the case M = R. Note that under quasilinear utility functions, transfer rules always can be bounded. That is, if (f, t) is ex post incentive compatible then there is boundedt such that (f,t) is ex post incentive compatible.
The difference between this result and the main theorem of JMMZ (2006) is the used toplogies. In this paper, we are using the uniform metric, while JMMZ (2006) considered the topology of the C n -uniform convergence 13 .
In order to derive the impossibility result, differentiable but not necessarily quasilinear utility functions are required that their µ i are locally monotonic in some direction, which is automatically satisfied for quasilinear utility functions. For n = 1, 2, . . . , ∞, let C n be the set of u ∈ U 0 satisfying the following for each i:
For continuous utility functions, we need a little complicated condition. Take continuous
is strictly increasing in α, where 
A Cardinality-Free Topology
Debreu (1968) defined a metric on the space of the closed preferences, which is one of the most famous topologies on preference spaces. Let X be a metric space and P be the set of continuous, transitive and complete preference relations. Each element ∈ P is a closed subset of X 2 . 14 Debreu (1968) endowed the preference space P with the Hausdorff metric.
In our model, preferences are dependent on θ ∈ Θ so we need to extend this topology. We take two approaches to the extension. The first approach is to consider a state-dependent preference (θ) as a bundle of preferences ( (θ)) θ∈Θ . For state-dependent preferences (·) and (·), we define a "uniform metric": 15
where ρ is the Hausdorff metric. The other approach is regarding a state-dependent preference (·) as preferences˙ on (x, θ). One possible definition of˙ would be {(x, θ; y, θ) | x (θ) y}, but θ is redundant. Instead we can define it by {(x, y, θ) | x (θ) y}, and we denote it by S( (·)). We define the second metric by
In fact, these two topologies are the same because of the continuity of utility functions. A proof is in Appendix.
By additionally assuming the following assumption, we can show that our arguments are valid even under the metrics defined above. A little more detailed explanations are in Appendix.
Assumption 1. For all u ∈ U and θ ∈ Θ,
for each i ∈ N .
Weakening Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
We have found that in various utility function spaces meaningful public decision rules cannot be ex post incentive compatible under generic utility functions. A possible question is whether we can make incentive compatibility possible by weakening the concept of incentive compatibility.
One natural way to weaken ex post incentive compatibility is localizing this concept. Ex post incentive compatibility is a global concept in the sense that the inequality
is satisfied globally. We can weaken this concept by restricting the range of θ andθ i .
14 Here, as usual, a binary relation P on X is defined as a subset of X 2 , and xP y denotes (x, y) ∈ P . 15 Since (% (θ)) θ∈Θ is an element of a product space Q θ∈Θ P, conventionally it is natural to use the product topology instead of the topology induced by this metric. The product topology is however so fine that if (%n (·)) ∞ n=0 converges to % (·) then %n (θ) and % (θ) must be coincide for almost all θ. In fact, %n (θ) = % (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ because our utility functions are continuous with respect to θ. Under such a strong topology, our arguments are useless. 
For example, this condition is satisfied in the situation that ex post agent i of type θ i ∈ U i has no incentive to deviate from the truth-telling, that is, in the situation that (2) is satisfied
Can we avoid the generic impossibility under such an incentive compatibility concept? The next result gives us a negative answer.
Theorem 6. There exists a residual set R of U 0 (η) such that for all u ∈ R the following holds: For all public decision rule f and connected open sets
++ and θ * ∈ Θ * , applying the technique used in the proof of Theorem 1, we can take a residual set R(q, θ * ) whose element u satisfies the following: For all public decision rule f , if f is ex post incentive compatible within
Since Q ++ and Θ * are countable sets, R is also residual. Take arbitrary u ∈ R and connected open set U i ⊆ Θ i• for each i, and assume that f is ex post incentive compatible under u. We see that f is constant within U = U 1 × U 2 .
Let S be the set of (q,
It would be worth mentioning about another weakened incentive compatibility. Consider a concept of incentive compatibility in which (2) holds for all θ ∈ Θ andθ i ∈ Θ satisfying θ i −θ i < ε (ε > 0). This concept is also impossible for sufficiently small ε, since we can derive the ex post taxation principle for this concept.
Conclusion
We proved impossibility theorems about ex post incentive compatibility. These results tell us that constructing meaningful ex post incentive compatible mechanisms is usually impossible.
One possible next step is to find other concepts which is robust against subjective belief ex post incentive compatibility. This paper partly answers it with a negative result: Locally ex post incentive compatible mechanisms are locally constant in generic situations. Thus, we need to search for concepts other than localized ex post incentive compatibility. 
APPENDIX
A Piecewise Linear Approximation
Denote by d the induced weak order.
, which is obviously a simplicial complex. Now assume that we constructed a simplicial complex
Lemma 8.
C d is a simplicial complex whose union is
[0, 1] d . 2. For S d ∈ C d , a. there exists x ∈ V d such that S d ⊆ d n=1 [x n , x n + α], and b. for each k = d − 1, d, there exist x, x ∈ S d such that x − x = αe k ,
where e k 's k-th element is 1 and the other elements are 0.
The second statement is obvious. To prove the first statement, we use the following notion and lemma. We say ( Here, we see a representation of co S 1 ∩ co S 2 for each case. These representations obviously imply that co S 1 ∩ co S 2 is a common face of S 1 and S 2 and the property (27) is satisfied.
In this case, co S 1 ∩ co S 2 is written as co{(y
Case 2:
Due to the assumption, co S 1 ∩ co S2 has a representation as the convex hull of {(y
z}).
Case 3:
In this case, co S 1 ∩ co S 2 is the convex hull of {(y,
Case 4:
In this case we can use Case 3.
Lemma 8 is an easy corollary of Lemma 9. Using Lemma 8, we can do approximation using piecewise linear functions as explained in section .
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 2
At first, we define functions χ i which is useful in the proof of Lemma 2. They are also used to prove Lemma 7.
Given ε > 0 and Proof. We prove the case ofχ
Case 1: lim n→∞ γ n >γ.
by the continuity of µ i [u i n ], and 
The maximum is well-defined because it coincides with distance between θ i + λ i η i and the boundary of the closure of {θ
Then for each n, there must beθ 
Now we can define a continuous mapping
We state this fact in the form of lemma.
Lemma 11. χ i is continuous.
Now we prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. What we should prove is that (A 1 (f ), A 2 (f )) ∈ S * . We prove the first part of the definition of S * only. The second part is similarly proved.
By the convexity of
Step 1: There is
By the definition of
Step 2:
Step 3:
It is the same as Step 2.
C Proof of Lemma 5
We use a proof by contradiction. Assume that
and that when we substitute θ 2 =θ 2 + αη 2 into this equation, the value becomesp + γα where γ = ||ζ
, which is finite by the definition of V 1 . We reduce the problem to a two-dimensional case, by considering a space spanned by η 1 and ζ 1 atθ
. We identify each elementθ 1 +x 1 η 1 +x 2 ζ 1 of S 1 with (x 1 , x 2 ), 17 and then S 1 can be seen asS
By the definition of implementation, φ(α) is not empty. The following fact leads a contradiction since an uncountable set α∈ 2 φ(α) is a subset of a finite set D.
which is strictly increasing with respect to α i . Thus we can say that (x
, and
Appendix D Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 12.
Proof. We start with a proof of the first statement. We prove
. By the definition of implementation, we already know X 1 ⊆ Y + . We use a proof by contradiction. Assume there is x ∈ X 1 \ Y + . Since x is in an open set Θ \ Y + , which is a subset of X 2 , there is α > 0 and ε 1 
Notice that X 1,n \ X 2,n ⊆ Y +,n . By the monotonicity of (A 1 , A 2 ), x + n −1 is in X 1,n \ X 2,n and thus in Y +,n if it is in Θ i• .
Step 2: There is a sequence ,n(m) ). By the closedness of A 1 , U (ε 2 ;x) ⊆ X 1 , and thus U (min i ε i ;x) ⊆ X 1 ∩ X 2 . This contradicts the assumption that the interior of
Step 3: Contradiction.
17 The function (x1, x2) →θ 1 + x1η 1 + x2ζ 1 is a bijection since η 1 and ζ 1 are linearly independent.
Notice that t i (θ j n ) must be in M 2 . Taking a converging subsequence of ( 
We use a proof by contradiction. Assume such a sequence exists. Since (x n ) ∞ n=0 is a sequence of a compact space Θ i , there is its converging subsequence (x n(m) ) ∞ m=0 . Denote its limit byx. Thenx must not be in S k by the construction of (x n ) ∞ n=0 , but we can obtainx ∈ S k by the closedness of A k . This is a contradiction.
Step 2: For all
Again we use a proof by contradiction. Assume we can take a subsequence (S n (m) )
This implies that each S ,n (m) contains U (ε; x) as its subset. Since A is closed, U (ε; x) is also forced to be a subset of S . Therefore a nonempty open set
Step 3: Convergence.
We explain max x∈S k min x ∈S k,n ||x − x || ≤ ε for sufficiently large n. S k is a union of three sets:
is an open set, we can apply Step 2 to each x ∈ S \ T . As a corollary of the first statement of this lemma, each point of (S k ∩ S ) \ ∂Θ i can be approximated by some sequence of
Because ε is taken arbitrary, both max x ∈S k,n min x∈S k ||x − x || and max x∈S k min x ∈S k,n ||x − x || must converge to 0, as n goes to infinity. This is the definition of convergence of S k,n to S k .
D.1 Hyperplain Segments and Hyperplain Complexes
We define a (d-dimensional) hyperplain segment as a closed convex subset H of some d-dimensional hyperplain H such that, under the relative topology of H , the interior of H is nonempty. We let H n seg denote the set of d-dimensional hyperplain segments. For each d ∈ N \ {0} and H ∈ H d seg , we define o(H) as the set of x ∈ R d+1 orthogonal to H, that is, x satisfying x · y = x · y for all y, y ∈ H. We call a finite set
Hereafter we consider a compact convex subset X of R d+1 with nonempty interior.
Lemma 13. Assume that a sequence
(S t ) ∞ t=0 of H un (η, X) converges to S ∈ H un (η, X), that N (S t ) ≤ N (S) for all t, and that O = {o(H) | ∃S ∈ {S, S 0 , S 1 , . . .}, H ∈ C ∈ c(S )} is a finite set. Let C ∈ c
(S).
Then the following statements are satisfied:
Figure 4:
there is t > 0 such that, for all t > t , N (S) = N (S t ).
The next lemma is used to prove Lemma 13. For ε > 0, we say that Proof. We use mathematical induction with respect to K. The proof is obvious when K = 1. Now we give the proof for the case K =N > 1 given that this lemma is true for K =K − 1. By the separating hyperplain theorem, we can take a hyperplain {x ∈ R d | α x = β} such that A 1 ⊆ T 1 and A 2 ⊆ T 2 , where
We can immediately see that S ∩ T 1 or S ∩ T 2 is (r/2)-thick. If S ∩ T i is (r/2)-thick, we can say that at least one of the elements
Let ρ be the Hausdorff metric.
Proof of Lemma 13. The second statement is an easy corollary of the first. Thus we prove the first only. We name elements of
Step 1:
is at most Aε-thick if ε is sufficiently close to 0, where A > 0 is some constant. 
Thus we obtain r(Z) < {2 |O|+2 (1 + (1/2d))}ε, when ε is sufficiently small. 
D.2 Dense Existence of Thin
is at least ε-thick. We omit the argument B when it is obvious. 
Lemma 16. Letθ
Proof. By monotonicity of (
D.3 Local Non-Constancy
. We say a mapping f from topological space X to some set Y is locally constant at x ∈ X if f (U ) is a singleton for some open neighborhood U of x. 
D.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Step 1: Construction of a mapping F . 
Since atθ 1B2 is not locally constant, for some k, H k is not locally constant atθ 1 either. Taking sufficiently small open ballθ Appendix E Proof of Lemma 7 Proof. The proof is routine, and left to the reader.
Proof of Lemma 7 . Take an arbitrary sequence {u n } ∞ n=0 of U(S * ∩ T ). By definition of U(S * ∩ T ), we can take t n ∈ T and (A 1,n , A 2,n ) ∈ S * ∩ T such that (u n , t n ) implements (A 1n , A 2n ) for each n. Without loss of generality, we can assume that {(A 1n , A 2n )} ∞ n=0 is a converging sequence, since C(Θ) is a compact metric space. We define t ∈ T by t i (a, θ j ) = lim inf n→∞ t i n (a, θ j ). We let u = lim n→∞ u n and A k = lim n→∞ A k,n for each k = 1, 2. Since T is closed, (A 1 , A 2 ) ∈ T .
Step 1: (u, t) implements (A 1 , A 2 ).
Take arbitrary i ∈ N and θ j ∈ Θ j and fix them. We denote t 2 . We see that the converse is also true. Take arbitrary P ∈ P i and ε > 0, and let U = {P ∈ P i | d 1 (P, P ) < ε}. Assume that for all δ > 0 there is P (δ) ∈ P i such that d 2 (P, P (δ) ) < δ and d 2 (P, P (δ) ) ≥ ε. Then we can take a sequence (P n ) ∞ n=0 such that lim n→∞ d 2 (P, P n ) = 0 but d 1 (P, P n ) ≥ ε for all n.
Case 1: There are infinitely many n such that min (sn,tn)∈P12(θn) ||(s n , t n ) − (s, t)|| ≥ ε for some (s n , t n ; θ n ) ∈ P 12,n .
In this case, by the compactness of M and Θ, we can take a converging subsequence (s n(m) , t n(m) ; θ n(m) ) ∞ m=0 satisfying the above property. Denote the limit by (s ∞ , t ∞ ; θ ∞ ). Since lim n→∞ d 2 (P, P n ) = 0, (s ∞ , t ∞ ; θ ∞ ) must be in P 12 Thus for sufficiently large n, (s , t ) ∈ P 12 (θ n ) and (s n , t n ) ∈ P (θ n ) and ||(s , t ) − (s n , t n )|| < ε. This is a contradiction.
Case 2: There are infinitely many n such that min (s,t)∈P12,n(θn) ||(s n , t n )−(s, t)|| ≥ ε for some (s n , t n ; θ n ) ∈ P 12 .
As in Case 1, using Assumption 1 we obtain an contradiction. Details are left to readers.
Due to the next lemma, we know that approximation in utility functions is also approximation in preferences. Let P (u i ) be the preference induced by u i . Proof. We can prove this lemma by techniques used in the proof of Lemma 18. Details are left to readers.
Finally, all we need is the following lemma. The rest of the argument does not require any modifications. To prove this lemma, we can use quite similar techniques used in the original lemmata. 
